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1The last …fteen years have seen an explosion of contributions in the …eld
of political economy. This literature is characterized by two features. First,
it chie‡y aims at explaining actual economic policies, rather than taking it
as exogenous, as do ”conventional economics”. Second, it departs from the
assumption often made in conventional economics that policy is determined by
maximizing a social welfare function. It explicitly takes into account that policy
is determined by a political mechanism, and therefore will re‡ect the interests of
the most powerful groups in society. It has tackled a wide variety of topics, such
as the determination of redistributive taxation, in‡ation, budget de…cits, school
…nance, labor market policies, capital taxation, trade liberalization, privatiza-
tion and restructuring in transition economies, and so on. It typically generates
predictions about how policies that are actually pursued will depend on the
distribution of agent’s incomes and endowments, and on political institutions.
Given the size of the literature, it has become crucial to organize it and
evaluate what has been learned. Two new books, Political Economy in Macroe-
conomics by Allan Drazen, and Political Economy: Explaining Economic Policy
by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, achieve this goal. Each is best con-
sidered as a textbook, and while they cover many common topics, their focus
is di¤erent. Drazen mostly focuses on applications for macroeconomic policy,
while Persson and Tabellini pay more attention to the institutional details of
decision-making. Both books are very well written and concise, and I highly
recommend them to any student interested in political economy, while they will
greatly simplify the task of any professor teaching that topic.
The book by Drazen deals with most of the aspects a macroeconomist would
like to know about. It is mostly theoretical in the sense that it presents a variety
of models in detail, but for each topic it systematically reviews the empirical
literature. It has fourteen chapters, themselves aggregated into four parts. It
starts by introducing some basic tools of economics (overlapping generations,
principal-agent theory, optimization) and politics (median voter theorem, Down-
sian competition, lobbying, etc.). While the economic tools are analyzed explic-
itly, and the corresponding models are solved for, the discussion of political
economy tools is much more cursory. This re‡ects the book’s emphasis on eco-
nomic outcomes rather than political institutions. The next part of the book
2reviews the large literature on credibility, commitment, and reputation. A large
chapter then discusses the role of elections, and is mostly devoted to the anal-
ysis of political business cycle (in a broad sense) models. This includes the old
and more recent literature on the synchronization between the timing of policy
and the timing of elections–i.e. Nordhaus’s (1975) opportunistic PBC model,
Hibbs’s (1977) partisan PBC, and Alesina’s (1987) rational partisan PBC; and
models of rational prospective voting where the incumbent government stimu-
lates the economy for strategic reasons, whether to signal its type as in Rogo¤
and Siebert (1988), or to tie the next government’s hands as in Persson and
Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). The next chapter is devoted
to redistribution, where the literature can be split between median-voter based
explanations (as exempli…ed by Meltzer and Richard (1981)), and models where
redistribution bene…ts special interest groups (as in Weingast et al. (1981)). The
author then deals with public goods, mostly focusing on the free rider problem
in public good provision. The next chapter, Chapter 10, analyzes problems of
inaction, delay, and crises, that are especially relevant to issues of stabilization
in developing countries. It asks how uncertainty and vested interests may lead
to delay in policy decisions, and what role crises may play in triggering reform.
These are fascinating, but complex topics, in particular because such notions
as ”uncertainty” or ”crisis” may encompass a variety of very di¤erent phenom-
ena. Chapter 11 deals with the most studied topic of factor accumulation and
growth, where there is con‡ict of interest over policies that a¤ect the economy’s
long-run growth rate; many of these models generate predictions about how the
growth rate depends on the distribution of income and the extent of democrati-
zation. Chapter 12 is entirely devoted to international aspects, and there only
macroeconomic issues are discussed; for example, the political economy of trade
restrictions is not discussed. The role of exchange rate arrangements is …rst
discussed, with applications to pegging, currency unions, and balance of pay-
ments crises. The author then turns to international coordination of monetary
policies, and …nally discusses international capital ‡ows. As the chapter makes
clear, most of this literature is political economy only in a ”weak” sense. While
one often gets interesting implications about which institutional arrangement is
optimal, and which monetary policy will be pursued, few of these models relate
3outcomes to con‡icts of interests and political institutions. Many important di-
rections of research are still far from completely explored. For example, how do
interest groups a¤ect the allocation of foreign capital, and how does that a¤ect
the likelihood and anatomy of balance-of-payment crises? Chapter 13 deals with
the political economy of reform and transition. This literature has largely been
motivated by the reform process in former Communist countries. It has made
important insights into how political constraints may shape the timing and de-
sign of economic reforms. Finally, the last chapter reviews the literature about
the size of government, and the more ambitious one about the frontier of nations.
These two literatures are gathered in the same chapter because they insist on
…scal con‡icts and institutions as a key determinant of the size of governments
and nations. This emphasis has led to quite valuable empirical predictions, but
one may feel that it is somewhat excessive. One might like to see more work on
the determinants of the scope of governments, which has considerably evolved
along history (some literature is brie‡y reviewed in the chapter), while cultural
and historical issues surely play a big role in the determination of nations—and
economic theory may well o¤er some insights about these aspects as well.
The book by Persson and Tabellini has 19 chapters grouped in four parts,
and it starts with a very useful presentation of the various tools that can be
used in order to analyze the political process. These tools allow to go beyond
the standard median voter theorem, and to capture phenomena that cannot be
understood with that basic result. What is very nice is that the models pre-
sented are all as simple and easy to use as the median voter theorem. That is,
they are equally operational for the economist who is interested in generating
predictions about actual outcomes. Hence, in Chapters 2 and 3, the reader
is shown how single-crossing preferences may be used instead of single-peaked
ones get a Condorcet winner—a very useful property that arises quite naturally
in a variety of models; how intermediate preferences may be used to increase
the dimension of the policy space; how probabilistic voting may be obtained by
assuming a stochastic, speci…c taste for a given party—with the fundamental
prediction that groups who care less have a more elastic voting behavior, and
are therefore more likely to be favored by policy; and how one can also introduce
campaign contributions by organized lobbies. Clearly, all these approaches only
4apply to problems speci…ed in an adequate way; otherwise, the basic impossibil-
ity results appear again. But they are nevertheless extremely useful. In chapters
4 and 5, the authors present models that are meant to represent more accurately
some real-world phenomena such as legislative bargaining , agenda-setting, etc.
These models are then fully used in Part III, ”Comparative Politics”, which
studies how di¤erent political constitutions a¤ect economic outcomes such as
taxes, the provision of public goods, transfers to speci…c groups, and dissipa-
tion of government receipts in the form of politicans’ rents. In that part, of
particular interest is Chapter 10, which analyzes the strength and weaknesses
of presidential vs. parliamentary regimes. Before that, Part II deals with re-
distributive politics, which is split between general interest politics and special
interest politics. While the distinction between the two is not so clear to me
(in a democracy of self-interested citizens, all politics is about special interests),
in Persson and Tabellini this refers to the di¤erence between models where all
voters directly vote on policy and models where it is determined by more com-
plex procedures and by representatives rather than the people themselves. In
that part the material covered can also be found in Drazen. The authors deal
with redistribution, pensions, regional transfers, and unemployment bene…ts,
this latter topic not being covered by Drazen. Finally, part IV and V overlap a
lot with Drazen. They deal with similar macroeconomic issues: public debt de-
termination, growth, political business cycles, capital taxation, credibility and
time consistency of monetary policy, and international policy coordination. The
last chapter, Chapter 19, is a short put penetrating and honest assessment of
what has been achieved and suggests many directions of further research.
If one criticism can be made with respect to the contents of both books, it
is that given their size (763 pages and 627 pages), they could have dispensed
with dealing with the traditional literature on credibility and time consistency,
which is already well reviewed in most macroeconomics textbooks and in some
excellent surveys such as Cukierman (1992), for example. Furthermore, this
literature has achieved little in the last ten years and it is not obvious to me
whether it …ts in a political economy text. True, policy is endogenous, and often
ine¢cient; but there are no con‡icts of interest. More generally, it could be
useful to distinguish agency problems, that are well understood and associated
5with traditional issues of commitment, observability, and incentives, from ”true
political economy” where con‡icts of interests and political institutions play a
key role.
Both books are well representative of the considerable progress made by
the …eld in the last decade of the 20th century; they are also very successful at
pointing out new research directions, and at highlighting the main shortcomings
of the approach. I now want to discuss these shortcomings and illustrate them
with examples drawn from both books.
The …rst problem, although some may think otherwise, is that political econ-
omy pushes the rationality assumption even farther than economics. It follows
the established practice of economics of assuming rational expectations, but
that assumption is much more questionable in the case of political economy.
In a macroeconomic model, for the rational expectations assumption to be
valid, it is only necessary that agents understand the determinants of the vari-
ables of interest in the equilibrium in which the economy happens to be. For
example, the functioning of the economy may be quite complicated, but if its
dynamics, in a reduced form, are linear and …rst-order, to forecast prices it is
only necessary to know the coe¢cients describing how prices at t depend on
the vector of state variables at t ¡ 1: Admittedly, this is already asking for a
lot, particularly if one introduces nonlinearities or assumes that the economy is
away from its stochastic steady state.
However, when one uses rational expectations in political economy models,
one goes one step further. In order to be able to compute their gains from a
policy change, agents must fully understand how such a policy change a¤ects
the behavior of the economy. In particular, they need to fully take into account
general equilibrium e¤ects. If such policy changes were taking place randomly
and regularly just like other shocks, one would just need to know, again, their
reduced form e¤ects on the variables of interest. This is plausible in some cases,
for example when one is considering common policy shifts such as a tax cut or
a rise in interest rates.
But in most cases, this is clearly not the case. Policy changes do not occur
frequently and are the outcome of a constantly evolving set of ideologies. These
ideologies themselves re‡ect the evolution of knowledge about how the economy
6works. Proposals that were common recipes thirty years ago are no longer on
the agenda, and vice-versa. Therefore, many reforms are unique and in many
cases they are the response to a crisis which is itself unique. In such cases, to
properly evaluate the e¤ect of the reform one would need a complete, structural,
general equilibrium model of the economy, with a con…dent knowledge that the
model will work in an environment that never prevailed in the past. While
this is doable for the virtual agents and the simple economies of our models, in
practice this is pushing rationality very far. In fact, many political con‡icts are
not only con‡icts of interest but also con‡icts about how the economy functions.
For example, the proposal to cure unemployment via working time reduction,
which is so popular in some European countries, re‡ects the belief of many
politicians that total hours worked are …xed, or at least sluggish, and that
there are no prospects of job creation in new sectors. Despite its theoretical
shortcomings and all the evidence to the contrary, it is too easy to dismiss
this argument as a cynical excuse for a measure that redistributes in favor
of insiders. It is actually connected to an intellectual tradition which regards
aggregate quantities as quite unresponsive to prices, and considers that wage
moderation has little impact on employment. This tradition is discredited in
Anglo-Saxon countries but still quite in‡uential in many French circles.
Another example of the same sort is pointed out by Piketty (1995), who
argues that people favor or not redistribution depending on their belief on its
distortionary e¤ects. These beliefs are formed on the basis of one’s own experi-
ence. Thus, a ”right-winger” is not a rich person but somebody who experienced
upward mobility as the result of his e¤ort, while a ”left-winger” could be quite
rich as the outcome of raw luck, and hence believe that income bears little re-
lation to e¤ort, so that redistribution is not very distortionary. In that paper,
con‡icts are entirely due to di¤erent beliefs about how the economy works. But
the paper also illustrates how di¢cult it is to make these arguments plausible
in the context of a simple mathematical model. In the model, it would be very
easy for individual agents to learn the true distortionary impact of taxation,
at an arbitrarily small cost, by slightly varying their e¤ort level and see what
comes out. The point is that one cannot represent a phenomenon associated
with the world’s complexity in a model where the world is simple.
7This problem is particularly salient when one is dealing with issues such as
the political economy of transition. How can voters in a country that has not
experienced market institutions for half a century or more …gure out the e¤ect
of introducing these institutions on their welfare? One may argue that the key
motivation to move from communism to capitalism was a naive comparison with
the West’s living standards, which ignored all issues associated with transition.
This suggests one possible, simple route for thinking about how individuals with
limited rationality evaluate their gains from reform, i.e. by simple comparisons
with other economies.
Another way is illustrated by Drazen’s discussion of the impact of unemploy-
ment bene…ts on the viability of reform. As argued by Aghion and Blanchard
(1994), high unemployment bene…ts increases the political support for reform
to the extent that it makes people more willing to give up their job in the public
sector to …nd one in the new private sector. This result obtains in a simple
model where general equilibrium e¤ects are shut down. However, as Atkeson
and Kehoe (1995) argue, in general equilibrium unemployment bene…ts may in-
crease aggregate consumption demand by reducing the need for precautionary
savings. This in turn leads to an increase in interest rates which makes peo-
ple less willing to engage in investment activities, including job search. With
this example, we clearly see that taking into account such general equilibrium
e¤ects assumes that agents are far more sophisticated than in Aghion and Blan-
chard. Indeed, my intuition would have suggested that higher unemployment
bene…ts reduce interest rates in the short run, since they reduce employment
and thus the marginal product of capital. Other general equilibrium e¤ects of
unemployment bene…ts may also overturn Aghion and Blanchard’s results. For
example, in Saint-Paul (2000, ch. 5), I give an example where the value of
being unemployed serves as an outside option of incumbent employees in wage
determination, so that higher unemployment bene…ts increase wages in such a
way that the utility loss associated with losing one’s job is una¤ected. In such
a world, the Aghion/Blanchard e¤ect is entirely o¤set by general equilibrium
e¤ects, and, in fact, there is no way one can insure oneself against job loss in
general equilibrium. If this is understood, no social demand for unemployment
bene…ts will arise. Such general equilibrium e¤ects may well be quite relevant.
8For example, Cohen (1999), inspired by a recent study of Flinn (1997), …nds
that the present discounted value of earnings lost by a worker who becomes
unemployed is higher in France than in the U.S., despite much more gener-
ous unemployment bene…ts in France. So, in equilibrium, American workers
are actually better insured by the functioning of their labor market than their
French counterpart by their generous social welfare system. The question, how-
ever, is whether they are willing to bet on that when voting on a reduction in
unemployment bene…ts.
Another example surveyed by Drazen, also in the context of the political
economy of transition, is a paper by van Wijnbergen (1992), who argues that
gradual price liberalization may backlash and be abandoned by voters prior to
completion. The argument is that, once prices have been partially liberalized,
expectations of further increase in prices may induce speculators to store goods
rather than supplying them to the market. Consumers then wrongly infer a
low, or even negative, supply response to prices, which may induce them to
vote in favor of abandoning the reform. This argument certainly carries much
empirical relevance, but it is based on consumers being imperfectly rational. If
they understood that the low supply response is only a short-run phenomenon
due to speculative behavior, i.e. if they understood the economy’s functioning
as well as speculators, they would not draw that inference. Indeed, a brutal
fall in supply would signal a very ‡at marginal cost schedule, and they should
deduct from it that supply would rise a lot in response to a permanent increase
in prices.
This discussion suggests that perhaps voters base their decision much more
on the direct impact of the proposed policy on their welfare than on its general
equilibrium e¤ects, that are much more di¢cult to evaluate. An important step
in that direction is a recent paper by Gersbach and Schniewind (1999), who
considers a model of wage formation by centralized bargaining where unions
take into account the direct impact of their decisions on their members but
only gradually learn their general equilibrium e¤ects once policy has been im-
plemented. The key di¢culty is to establish rigorous criteria in order to de…ne
which e¤ects are taken into account by voters and which are not, rather than
make arbitrary assumptions about them.
9A second problem of the ‘New Political Economy’ is that theory is well
ahead of measurement. One is already well aware of empirical problems in con-
ventional economics, where one tries to relate outcomes to policies. In political
economy, one wants to explain policies by more fundamental determinants such
as the distribution of voters preferences and the structure of political institu-
tions. There is very little time variation in these variables. The constitution of
the United States, for example, has been amended but has never changed. The
French constitution has been unchanged since 1958, the Spanish one since 1978.
This forces to use cross-country studies, with the associated problems of data
comparability, measurement problems, and outliers. These problems are rein-
forced by the fact that many variables—such as political instability, prominence
of coalition governments, or the electoral system—are not easily quanti…able.
One is often left with few observations and many explanatory variables being
”indices” whose construction involves a lot of subjective judgement.
Although both books are mostly theoretical, they both provided detailed
surveys of the empirical literature. Let us brie‡y illustrate the di¢culties of
empirical research in political economy by discussing two strands of literature,
one of which is a plain failure, the other a modest success.
The failure is the political economy of growth. A fairly accepted empirical
fact is that greater inequality reduces growth; the political economy literature
has suggested a very natural, and plausible mechanism, to explain that. The
idea is that in a democracy, greater inequality is associated with greater in-
centives for redistributive taxation; in other words, the median becomes poorer
relative to the mean. Taxation in turn is distortionary, and typically reduces the
incentives for capital accumulation. Countries with higher inequality therefore
grow less fast, although whether this is a true growth e¤ect or a level e¤ect
ultimately depends on which assumptions are made regarding technology.
Now, this very basic story is rejected twice by the data (see Perotti, 1996).
First, there is no evidence that taxation is higher in more inegalitarian countries—
the typical tax champion is a very egalitarian European country, while taxes are
low in high inequality countries such as Brazil. Second, more redistribution does
not necessarily reduce growth.
The …rst failure looks like a clear rejection of the standard median voter the-
10ory. In fact, one may try to amend that theory to reconcile it with the data1, by
relaxing assumptions about linearity of the tax system, the usefulness of public
expenditures, the localization of increases in inequality across income centiles,
and the distribution of political participation. But the presumption remains
that the median voter theory is probably the wrong approach to understand
redistribution. Redistribution consists of a large number of programs, and the
median voter is unlikely to bene…t from these individual programs. It is proba-
bly better to understand these policies as targeted to those groups whose voting
behavior is most elastic, in accordance with the prediction of the stochastic vot-
ing theories well summarized in Chapter 3 of Persson and Tabellini. This would
probably help to explain redistribution in favor of groups such as farmers and
retirees. At the same time, some redistribution bene…ts small groups that are
able to spread the costs over society at large, as suggested by Weingast et al.
(1981). Finally, some redistribution towards the poorest re‡ects genuine altru-
ism or concern to alleviate negative externalities such as crime and insurrection
(See e.g. Grossman (1995)). This discussion suggests a much richer set of ex-
planations, but is likely to call for much more detailed empirical analysis than
the simple prediction that ”greater inequality increases redistribution”. But the
quality and availability of data may make that goal unreachable.
The moderate success is the modern partisan political business cycle liter-
ature. This literature predicts that left-wing governments will stimulate the
economy, while right-wing ones will cool it down. It is supported by the be-
havior of GDP growth rates following elections in the U.S. and other countries:
elections won by conservative governments are usually followed by slumps, while
elections won by left-wing governments are typically followed by recessions.
However, here some problems remain. First, partisan theories have a va-
riety of predictions, and some of them are much less supported by the data.
As Drazen (p. 265) points out, these models also predict a burst of in‡ation
after the election of a left-wing government, and the evidence is not supportive.
Second, the various brands of PBC models di¤er in some subtle ways, but there
is probably too much noise in macroeconomic data to allow us to exploit these
di¤erences in order to discriminate between models. These di¢culties are nicely
1See e.g. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996) for a discussion.
11illustrated by Drazen’s discussion of the empirical evidence (p. 260-268). For
example, the basic partisan PBC models predicts a boom following a left-wing
victory no matter what, while the rational partisan PBC model predicts that,
since only unanticipated in‡ation matters, the boom is short-lived and its in-
tensity is proportional to pre-election uncertainty about the outcome. While
Alesina et al. (1997) …nd that this prediction is borne by the data, Hibbs
(1992) disagrees. Since some speci…c episodes are at clear variance with this
”surprise” hypothesis, one is led to suspect that the results will depend heavily
on the way the surprise indicator is constructed.
Finally, another shortcoming of the new Political Economy literature is that
it relies heavily on speci…c examples in the context of simple abstract models.
This raises two issues. First, many results may be overturned by simply changing
an assumption, and given the model’s abstraction it is not obvious to assess
which modelling choice is more plausible. The literature runs the risk of having
the same fate as the theoretical IO literature, which was cynically summarized by
Schmalensee (1988, p.676) in the following way: ”Anything is possible”—indeed,
Political Economy has borrowed many tools and metaphors from theoretical IO,
such as wars of attrition, spatial competition, principal-agent models, dynamic
games, and so on. Second, the mapping of the models’ results to the real world
phenomenon it is supposed to represent is often far from obvious. When one
writes down a simple model of say, monetary policy, there is a large background
of research that one can use to build the speci…cation. Hence, for example,
one may start with a simple output-in‡ation trade-o¤, and be con…dent that it
is indeed representing the way monetary policy works. By contrast, when one
uses, say, a two-period game to model the budgetary process in a ”presidential
system”, it is far less obvious that the assumptions being made are a reasonable
representation of such a process.
Let us use some speci…c examples borrowed from the two books under review
to better illustrate these points.
Part of the literature on the political economy of economic reform is in-
terested in ”gradualism”. Some of these papers argue that a gradual reform
strategy may be successful where ”big bang” may fail. Typically, this is because
the coalition in favor of the last stages of the reform will be di¤erent from the
12coalition in favor of the big-bang reform. Let us consider the following example,
borrowed from Wei (1997), and analyzed by Drazen in his Chapter 13. There
are two equal-sized groups, A, B and C, and reform consists of 2 pieces, labelled
1 and 2. The following table gives the net payo¤ to each group of each bit of
the reform.
A B C
1 1 -1.5 1
2 1 1 -1.5
It is then argued that a big-bang reform would be turned down since both
groups B and C would lose, while gradualism, i.e. voting on reform 1 …rst
and on reform 2 next, would implement the reform.2 Why? In the second stage
groups A and B support reform 2, regardless of what happened in the …rst stage.
Knowing that their vote does not in‡uence the outcome in the second stage, in
the …rst stage groups A and C support reform 1. Therefore, gradualism achieves
complete reform, while big bang was unable to do so.
This example has two shortcomings. First, one can simply reverse the con-
clusion by changing the numbers. Suppose net gains are now given by the
following table:
A B C
1 -1 2.5 -1
2 -1 -1 2.5
Gradualism now clearly fails to implement reform, while big bang would pass
with the support of groups B and C. So, what have we learned?
Second, the comparison between gradualism and big bang in the previous
example is somewhat confusing. The result that big bang fails implicitly rests on
the assumption that, if the complete reform is turned down, then the government
cannot propose a partial reform in the second stage, while this option is assumed
available when one considers the case of gradualism. That is, we are really
considering two di¤erent models, a one-shot game and a two-period game, rather
than two di¤erent strategies within the same model. If one were allowing a
partial reform to be proposed once a complete reform has been turned down,
and if it is known which partial reform will be proposed in the second stage,
2Note that the total reform increases aggregate welfare by 2 - 0.5 - 0.5 = 1.
13then there is simply no substantial di¤erence between gradualism and big bang;
each leads to the same outcome.
This example illustrates how results are fragile, and also how di¢cult it
is to map them to the real world. For real-world policy makers facing the
complex problem of reforming an economy in transition, big bang may simply be
inconceivable. Gradualism may simply be imposed by the need to act urgently
and the scarcity of the human capital needed to put together a complex reform
package. And, given that reform can be broken into a large number of pieces in
a somewhat arbitrary way, gradualism means considering the impact of a large
number of alternative sequencings. For n reform items, there are n! alternative
sequencing strategies, a number that grows very quickly with n: That is, the
problem faced by policy makers is very di¤erent than suggested by models such
as the above example.
Another well-known example is the argument by Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991) that uncertainty about the distribution of gains and losses from reform
may lead to status-quo bias. The argument is as follows. Consider a reform
which yields a gain of +1 to 60 % of the voters and a loss of -1 to the remain-
ing 40 %. This reform increases aggregate welfare, and if people knew exactly
whether they gain or lose, a majority of them (60 %) would support the reform.
Assume now that two thirds of the gainers, i.e. 40 % of voters, know exactly
that they will gain +1, while other voters are randomly allocated between the
remaining 20 % of gainers and the pool of losers. Therefore, their probability of
gaining from the reform is 20 % / (20 % + ¨40 %) = 1/3. Then the expected
gain from reform of those who do not know for sure they will win is equal to
+1 £ 1=3 + (¡1) £ 2=3 = ¡1=3 < 0: Clearly, their expected gain is negative, so
that they oppose the reform. Since they are 60 % of the population, reform is
blocked and the economy remains at the status quo.
This is a very nice example, and may be relevant to speci…c policy problems
such as trade reform. But there is clearly no general result about uncertainty
creating a bias in favor of the status quo. Going back to that example, suppose
now that half of the losers know for sure that they lose 1; while the remainder
of voters are again allocated randomly. Their probability of gaining is now 60 %
/(60 % + 20 %) = 3/4, so that their expected gain is +1 £3=4+(¡1)£1=4 =
141=2 > 0: Uncertainty now increases the support for reform from 60 % to 80 %
of the electorate.
A little bit of re‡ection suggests that uncertainty generates resistance to re-
form if it redistributes gains away from the decisive voter, but that the converse
holds if gains are redistributed in favor of him/her. Again, we have an example
where the result can easily be overturned.
Our last example will be borrowed from Chapter 10 in Persson and Tabellini.
In this chapter, which builds on their earlier work, the authors have an ambi-
tious task; namely, analyzing how various constitutional provisions for checks
and balances and the division of power a¤ect economic outcomes. They are in-
terested in understanding how congress representatives appointed by voters will
set policy under alternative legislative systems. Politicians decide on the provi-
sion of a public good; they can also reward their constituency with a transfer;
…nally, they can divert tax money for their own consumption purpose. Thus,
policy consists of a vector of numbers summarizing all these choices. After pol-
icy is selected, a popular election takes place where voters may punish their
representatives by not reelecting them.
The authors consider three systems.
In what they call ”pure legislature”, an agenda setter is randomly selected
to propose a whole policy vector. He must bring together a minimum winning
coalition in parliament for his proposal to be accepted. The members of such
a coalition have themselves to bring enough bene…ts to their constituency so as
to be reelected. The authors show that the agenda setter, by playing potential
members of the winning coalition against each other, manages to bring transfers
to constituencies other than his own down to zero. They also show that there is
an underprovision of public goods and that the agenda setter is able to obtain
a positive rent.
Then, they consider a ”Presidential-Congressional” (PC) system, where taxes
and expenditures are proposed by two separate agenda setters—labelled con-
gressional committees— representing di¤erent constituencies, and are voted sep-
arately. This introduces a system of checks and balances: By selecting a low
enough tax rate, the ”tax committee” will refrain the ”expenditure committee”
from setting high rents for itself and high transfers for its constituency. The
15authors then show that politicians don’t get any rents and that transfers to the
constituency of the expenditure committee are lower than in a ”pure legislature”
system. It is still true, however, that public goods are underprovided.
Finally, the authors consider a ”Parliamentary” regime, where there are
again two agenda setters, now interpreted as cabinet ministers, but where vot-
ing on each item does not take place separately. Rather, a crude form of bar-
gaining takes place where each minister can veto the other’s proposal, in which
case a default policy is set; if this does not take place, the joint proposal is
implemented. This assumption introduces the possibility of collusion between
the two agenda-setters, so that they are able to extract higher rents from the
tax payer than in the previous system. The authors also show, accordingly, that
taxes are higher than in the PC regime. The good side of collusion, however, is
that the public good provision problem is partially solved, so that public good
provision is higher, and thus closer to optimum, in the parliamentary regime
than in the PC regime.
The great beauty of this model is that it …ts well with the observation that
taxes as well as public goods provision are higher in parliamentary regimes
(typi…ed by many European countries) than in PC regimes such as the U.S.
The contribution is illustrative of the best contemporary research in theoretical
comparative political economy.
Yet, it has many shortcomings. In order to reach clear-cut, testable con-
clusions while maintaining tractability, one has to make assumptions that are
di¢cult to relate to real world constitutional features. For example, what does it
mean that agenda-setters are randomly selected? In many cases the constitution
speci…es how the agenda setter is selected following an election—for example,
the head of state (King, president) is in charge of selecting a candidate prime
minister to form a government. The assumptions about the timing are arbitrary
rather than re‡ecting what is speci…ed in constitutions. It is also assumed that
within each constituency voters coordinate on a punishment strategy in the next
election, which is questionable. The PC regime does not account for the role of
the president, which is important in countries such as France and the U.S. where
he is elected directly. More generally, strictly speaking there is no government
in the model, only a parliament. Finally, the bargaining which takes place in
16the parliamentary regime is ruled out by assumption in the PC regime, but in
that case too the two policymakers would have an incentive to collude.
Another issue is that it is not straightforward to apply the proposed taxon-
omy to real world arrangements. How should France, for example, be classi…ed?
The president is directly elected and, in addition to selecting the prime minister,
has a number of executive powers. The government must have the support of
a majority in parliament and proposes laws. How can this be matched to the
regimes described above? This constitution has lived through di¤erent types of
periods. Sometimes the president’s party was clearly dominant in both govern-
ment and parliament. This suggests a functioning similar to ”direct legislature”.
Sometimes it has been less dominant, which opens the door for legislative and
executive bargaining, thus making it somewhat similar to a parliamentary sys-
tem. Finally, one has witnessed periods where the president was not a member
of the parliamentary majority, which makes the system more similar to the
”Presidential-Congressional” one. That is, the way a country should be classi-
…ed not only depends on its constitution but also on election outcomes.
I hope that with these examples the reader will get the ‡avor of the di¢culties
associated with research in Political Economy. They should not deter him,
however, from entering this exciting and promising …eld of investigation, now
that he can use two excellent textbooks to learn more about it.
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